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THE HOSPITAL READMISSION REDUCTION PROGRAM: 
FRAUD AND ABUSE CONCERNS 
Courtney Mathews* 
INTRODUCTION 
 
As part of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 
(“PPACA”), the Hospital Readmissions Reduction Program (“Program”) 
requires the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (“CMS”) to reduce 
payments to Inpatient Prospective Payment System (“IPPS”) hospitals 
with excess readmissions, effective for Medicare discharges beginning on 
October 1, 2012.1  This Program is heavily debated, receiving mostly 
negative attention, and it is the only CMS program that does not utilize 
bonuses in addition to the heavy penalties CMS imposes.  Additionally, 
there is no opportunity for a hospital to opt out of the Program. 
 While critics widely argue that hospitals are not the right entity to 
hold accountable for readmissions; that the penalties disproportionately 
target academic hospitals and socioeconomically disadvantaged hospitals; 
and that readmissions do not reflect poor quality of care, critics very rarely 
voice concerns about the potential fraud and abuse concerns implicated by 
this Program.  Thus, while this article discusses the unintended 
consequences brought about by the implementation of the Program, this 
article also adds to the literature now three years of data supporting the 
predictions of the unintended consequences that implementation would 
bring.  Additionally, this article addresses an additional criticism rarely 
discussed: fraud and abuse concerns. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
* J.D., DePaul University College of Law (2014); B.A., Saint Louis University (2011).  Courtney is an 
Associate Attorney in the Health Care Practice Group at Clark Hill PLC in Chicago, IL where she assists 
clients with various health care law issues, including transactional, corporate, litigation, compliance, and 
fraud and abuse matters.  The author thanks Katherine Schostok and the DePaul Journal of Health Care 
Law for their guidance and editorial assistance, Bartlomiej Posnik, M.D. for the medical wisdom that he 
contributed to this Article, and her family for their support.  The views set forth herein are the author's 
personal views and not those of Clark Hill PLC. 
1 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 3025, 124 Stat. 119, 408 
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(q) (2010)). 
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II.  BACKGROUND 
 
A. Pre-PPACA Developments 
 
 Each year, the government agency Medicare Payment Advisory 
Commission (“MedPAC”) publishes two reports to Congress on its various 
Medicare issues.  A June 2007 report warned Congress that readmissions 
“result[] in additional Medicare spending; 17.6 percent of admissions 
result in readmissions within 30 days of discharge, accounting for $15 
billion in spending.”2  The report further advised Congress that while 
“[n]ot all of these readmissions are avoidable . . . some are.”3  In 2009, 
CMS began publicly reporting voluntarily provided readmission rates on 
its website Hospital Compare as an incentive for hospitals to reduce their 
readmissions for the following three conditions: acute myocardial 
infarction (heart attack) (“AMI”), heart failure (“HF”), and pneumonia 
(“PN”). 
 It has been suggested that hospitals’ reluctance to proactively 
reduce readmissions is attributable to the way in which Medicare pays its 
participating hospitals.4  Generally speaking, Medicare “pays hospitals a 
set fee for a patient’s stay, so the shorter the visit, the more revenue a 
hospital can keep.  Hospitals also get paid when patients return.”5  Before 
PPACA made clear that hospitals are responsible for readmissions (at least 
financially), there was general confusion regarding a hospital’s 
responsibility for a patient following discharge.6  Also contributing to the 
problem were “concerns about compensation, a lack of clear institutional 
policies, and the absence of legal mandates that patients be properly 
prepared for and monitored after discharge . . . .”7 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
2 MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMM’N, Report to the Congress: Promoting Greater Efficiency in 
Medicare, 103 (2007) MEDPAC, available at http://www.medpac.gov/chapters/jun07_ch05.pdf, 103. (June 
2007). 
3 Id. 
4 Jordan Rau, Hospitals Face Pressure From Medicare to Avert Readmissions, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27, 2012, 
at D1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/27/health/hospitals-face-pressure-from-medicare-to-
avert-readmissions.html?_r=0. 
5 Id. 
6 Thomas L. Hafemeister & Joshua Hinckley Porter, Don’t Let Go of the Rope: Reducing Readmissions by 
Recognizing Hospitals’ Fiduciary Duties to Their Discharged Patients, 62 AM. U. L. REV. 513, 514 (2013). 
7 Hafemeister & Porter, supra note 6 at 514. 
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B. The Enactment of PPACA and the Hospital Readmissions Reduction 
Program 
 
 PPACA carried lofty goals of enhancing the quality of health care, 
improving patient safety, and lowering overall health care spending.  
However, before it was enacted (and even after), PPACA faced 
significantly harsh opposition.  One of the biggest concerns was that 
PPACA would bankrupt the health care industry (or even United States).8  
Thus, to gain support, legislators included several programs that would 
reduce PPACA’s overall cost burden, and the Program, through its use of 
penalties and no incentives or rewards, was estimated by the 
Congressional Budget Office to reduce Medicare spending by 
approximately $7.1 billion between 2010 and 2019.9   
 
1. Calculation of a Readmission 
 
 For purposes of the Program, a “readmission” occurs when a 
patient is discharged from an applicable IPPS hospital to a nonaccute 
setting (e.g. skilled nursing facility, home health, rehabilitative center, or 
to the patient’s home) and is then re-admitted to the same or another 
applicable hospital within 30 days from the date of the initial discharge.10  
The Program applies to most short term acute care hospitals with 
exceptions for sole community hospitals, Medicare dependent hospitals, 
small rural hospitals, children’s hospitals, certain cancer and research 
centers, and hospitals that provide primarily long-term, rehabilitative, or 
psychiatric care.11   Additionally, only hospitals with at least 25 discharges 
for each of the three conditions are included in the readmission 
measures.12 
                                                           
8 See Florida ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 780 F. Supp. 2d 1256, 1296-97 (N.D. 
Fla. 2011) (“[PPACA] will have serious negative consequences, e.g., encouraging people to forego health 
insurance until medical services are needed, increasing premiums and costs for everyone, and thereby 
bankrupting the health insurance industry.”); David M. Herszenhorn, The Road Ahead Turns Right, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 4, 2010, at B1, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/04/business/04outlook.html?_r=0 (statement of House Speaker John 
Boehner) (“I believe that the health care bill that was enacted by the current Congress will kill jobs in 
America, ruin the best health care system in the world, and bankrupt our country.”). 
9 CBO Letter to Nancy Pelosi (March 20. 16, 2010), available at 
http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/amendreconprop.pdf 
10 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(q)(5)(E) (2010), amended by PL 113-185, Oct. 6, 2014, 128 Stat 1952; Medicare 
Program; Hospital Inpatient Prospective Payment Systems for Acute Care Hospitals and the Long Term 
Care Hospital Prospective Payment System and FY 2012 Rates; Hospitals’ FTE Resident Caps for 
Graduate Medical Education Payment; Final Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. 51476, 51666 (Aug. 18, 2011). 
11 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(q)(2)(B) (2010). amended by PL 113-185, Oct. 6, 2014, 128 Stat 1952. 
12 Id. 
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 In its Final Rule issued for fiscal year 2014, CMS broadened 
“planned readmissions” to exclude more readmissions from the Program,13 
but CMS has yet to exclude unrelated readmissions from its calculation.14  
Thus, a patient discharged for pneumonia, who is readmitted 20 days later, 
after a slip-and-fall accident, in the patient’s own home could serve as an 
additional readmission for the original admitting hospital.  For including 
unrelated readmissions, CMS reasoned that, “readmissions not directly 
related to the index condition may still be a result of the care received 
during the index hospitalization.”15 
 The readmissions calculations for a given hospital are complicated, 
but, essentially, the prospective diagnosis related group (“DRG”) payment 
that Medicare typically makes to a hospital will be reduced based upon the 
number of readmissions from that hospital above national average 
readmission rates for the specified conditions.16  In fiscal year 2013, 
penalties were assessed at a maximum of 1% of Medicare reimbursements 
for patients discharged July 2008 through June 2011 (with some 
adjustments for gender, age, and certain medical history conditions).17  
Beginning October 2013, the penalty increased from 1% to 2%, and in 
October 2014, the penalty increased to a cap of 3%.18  For fiscal year 
2015, the expanded conditions to be included in the Program (in addition 
to AMI, HF, and PN) include (1) acute exacerbation of chronic obstructive 
pulmonary disease, (2) elective total hip arthroplasty, and (3) elective total 
knee arthroplasty.19   
 
2. Years One, Two, and Three Penalties 
 
 CMS began levying penalties on October 1, 2012 (fiscal year 
2013) and 2,213 hospitals were penalized approximately $280 million in 
Medicare payments for excess readmissions.  Thus, on average, a given 
                                                           
13 See generally CMS Wants to Exclude More Readmissions from Penalty Program: How CMS’s FY 2014 
Pay Proposal Would Change Readmissions Math, THE DAILY BRIEFING, (May 1, 2013), 
http://www.advisory.com/Daily-Briefing/2013/05/01/CMS-wants-to-exclude-more-readmissions-from-
penalty-program. (May 1, 2013). 
14 Medicare Program; Hospital Inpatient Prospective Payment Systems for Acute Care Hospitals and the 
Long Term Care; Hospital Prospective Payment System and Fiscal Year 2014 Rates; Quality Reporting 
Requirements for Specific Providers; Hospital Conditions of Participation; Payment Policies Related to 
Patient Status; Final Rule, 78 Fed. Reg. 50496, 50654–55 (Aug. 19, 2013) [hereinafter CMS Final Rule]. 
15 CMS Final Rule,  at 50654. 
16 See 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(q)(4)(A) (2010), amended by PL 113-185, Oct. 6, 2014, 128 Stat 1952, for the 
precise calculation. 
17 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(q)(3)(C)(i)-(iii) (2010). 
18 Id. 
19 CMS Final Rule, supra note 14, at 50657. 
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hospital paid $126,525, but some larger hospitals paid close to $1,000,000 
in penalties.20  Thus, on average, a given hospital paid $126,525, but some 
larger hospitals paid close to $1,000,000 in penalties. For example, 
Barnes-Jewish Hospital in St. Louis, Missouri, which is well known for 
treating underserved populations and advanced care patients with chronic 
illnesses, paid about $1.9 million.21  For fiscal year 2014, Medicare 
penalized 2,225 hospitals for excess readmissions with 18 hospitals 
receiving the maximum penalty of a 2% reduction in Medicare 
payments.22  Finally, for fiscal year 2015, Medicare penalized a record 
high 2,610 hospitals, with 39 hospitals receiving the maximum 3% 
penalty.23 
 
III.  ANALYSIS 
 
A. Criticisms of the Program 
 
 Despite the perceived benefits of the readmission penalty, the 
Program has received significant criticism.  This is despite the existence of 
evidence from CMS that the Program has lowered readmissions.  In its 
February 2013 report to Congress, CMS stated that “the all-cause 
Medicare readmission rate had dropped to 17.8 percent in the last quarter 
of 2012, down from the historical 19 percent; that represents 70,000 fewer 
readmissions in Medicare.”24  Nonetheless, the criticisms outweigh the 
limited positive results, and the overinclusive character of the penalty 
harms hospitals and patients.   
 
 
 
 
                                                           
20 Jordan Rau, Medicare Revises Readmissions Penalties–Again, KAISER HEALTH NEWS, at 
http://www.kaiserhealthnews.org/stories/2013/march/14/revised-readmissions-statistics-hospitals-
medicare.aspx (Mar. 14, 2013). 
21 Jim Doyle, Most St. Louis Area Hospitals Improve Readmissions, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, available 
at http://www.stltoday.com/business/local/most-local-hospitals-improve-readmissions/article_e9d773d9-
e022-5be0-944b-f255ba94358e.html (Aug. 6, 2013). 
22 Jordan Rau, Armed with Bigger Fines, Medicare to Punish 2,225 Hospitals for Excess Readmissions, 
KAISER HEALTH NEWS, at http://www.kaiserhealthnews.org/Stories/2013/August/02/readmission-penalties-
medicare-hospitals-year-two.aspx (Aug. 2, 2013). 
23 Jordan Rau, Medicare Finds 2,610 Hospitals in Third Round of Readmission Penalties, KAISER HEALTH 
NEWS, at http://www.kaiserhealthnews.org/Stories/2014/October/02/Medicare-readmissions-penalties-
2015.aspx (Oct. 2, 2014).  
24 Medicare Hospital Readmissions Reduction Program, HEALTH POLICY BRIEFS, at 
http://www.healthaffairs.org/healthpolicybriefs/brief.php?brief_id=102 (Nov. 12, 2013). 
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1. Hospitals Are Not the Appropriate Entity to Hold Accountable 
 
 The first criticism centers on whether hospitals are the appropriate 
entity to hold accountable for readmissions.  Most events and 
circumstances preceding any given patient’s readmission take place 
outside of the hospital.25  Relatedly, one of the major problems of the 
Program is that it does not differentiate between related and unrelated 
readmissions.26  This is especially concerning in light of a recent study that 
concludes that at least 80% of hospital readmissions were unrelated to the 
initial admission.27  Thus, hospitals are being held accountable under this 
Program for patients’ carelessness or recklessness that may result in a 
completely unrelated readmission, not reflective of a hospital’s provided 
care. 
 
2. The Program Disproportionately Penalizes Academic and 
Safety-Net Hospitals 
 
 A second and heavily voiced concern is that the Program 
disproportionately penalizes hospitals that treat underserved populations 
and patients with complex conditions.  Many studies (including one from 
Medicare) have concluded that “. . . hospitals with the most poor and 
African-American patients tended to have higher readmission rates than 
hospitals with more affluent and Caucasian patients.”28  This is likely due 
to their lack of access to resources important to maintaining their health 
post-discharge, such as social support or primary care.  Evidence also 
suggests that patients with the most severe illnesses are at a particularly 
high risk for readmissions due to their underlying condition.29  
 As a result, large academic teaching hospitals (that care for the 
sickest patients) and safety-net hospitals (that care for the poorest patients) 
                                                           
25 See generally Reed Abelson, Hospitals Question Medicare Rules on Readmissions, N.Y. TIMES, March 
30, 2013 at B1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/30/business/hospitals-question-fairness-of-
new-medicare-rules.html (Mar. 29, 2013) (“Because so many hospital readmissions are tied to social or 
economic factors, hospitals have a hard time predicting which patients are likely to return . . . .”). 
26 Note, however, that the Program excludes some readmission measures unrelated to prior discharge, 
including planned readmissions and transfers to other applicable hospitals.  See supra note 13 and 
accompanying text. 
27 See Norbert I. Goldfield et al., Identifying Potentially Preventable Readmissions, 30 HEALTH CARE FIN. 
REV. 75–91 (2008). 
28 Rau, supra note 4, at D1.  
29 Karen E. Joynt et al., A Path Forward on Medicare Readmissions, 368 NEW ENG. J. MED.  13 at 1175 
(March 28, 2013). 
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received substantial penalties from the Program.30  Overall, 12% of 
hospitals treating the poorest patients received the maximum 1% reduction 
in Medicare payments for the first year of the program, while only 7% of 
hospitals treating the fewest poor patients received the maximum 1% 
penalty.31  Hospitals with a significant low-income population were more 
likely in general to receive a penalty of any size.32 
 These hospitals will be hit doubly hard by an additional provision 
of PPACA.  HHS will be reducing Disproportionate Share Hospital 
(“DSH”) payments to hospitals by 75% beginning in fiscal year 2015.33  
The year the DSH payment reduction is implemented is the same year that 
the maximum readmissions reduction penalty of 3% will also be 
implemented.  Thus, because readmissions are higher in hospitals that treat 
socioeconomically disadvantaged patients, many of these hospitals will 
lose reimbursements for readmissions and, additionally, will no longer be 
receiving DSH payments that they have come to rely upon, putting those 
hospitals in a severe financial struggle. 
 St. Bernard Hospital in Englewood, one of Chicago’s poorest 
neighborhoods, which received a five-star rating for its congestive heart 
failure program,34 was penalized the maximum 1% reduction in its 
Medicare payments in the first year of the program and received a 1.42% 
reduction in the second year of the program.35  St. Bernard received a hefty 
1.43% penalty in the third year of the program.36  Not only does St. 
Bernard treat many of the poorest patients in Chicago, but it also treats 
patients that “‘have no less than six or seven diagnoses.’”37  Patients who 
get home have “their lights and gas [] shut off,” and return to the hospital 
to “house them until [their] staff can help them get the utilities turned 
on.”38  The few patients who can even afford their medicine “sometimes 
                                                           
30 See generally Jordan Rau, Hospitals Treating the Poor Hardest Hit By Readmissions Penalties, KAISER 
HEALTH NEWS (Aug. 13, 2012) at http://www.kaiserhealthnews.org/Stories/2012/August/13/hospitals-
treating-poor-hardest-hit-readmissions-penalties.aspx. (Aug. 13, 2012). 
31 Id. 
32 Id. 
33 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(d)(5)(F)(i) (2010). 
34 Deborah L. Shelton, Hospitals Face Medicare Penalties for Readmissions, CHICAGO TRIBUNE (January 
30, 2012), available at http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2012-01-30/news/ct-met-readmission-rates-
20120130_1_readmissions-medicare-patients-heart-failure (January 30, 2012). 
35 FY 2015 IPPS Hospital Readmissions Reduction Program Supplemental Data File (Final Rule and 
Correction Notice), CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES, 
http://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Medicare-Fee-for-Service-Payment/AcuteInpatientPPS/Readmissions-
Reduction-Program.html  (last visited October 13, 2014). 
36 Id. 
37 Shelton, supra note 34. 
38 Id. 
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ration the pills, taking them less often than they are supposed to in order to 
make them last longer.”39 
An analysis of the seven academic hospitals in Illinois also reveals 
a disproportionate penalty levied against academic hospitals, which as 
previously stated, often treat the most complex medical conditions.  All 
seven academic hospitals were penalized with the following penalties in 
years one, two, and three of the program, respectively:  Loyola University 
Medical Center (0.39%/0.23%/0.16%), Northwestern Memorial Hospital 
(0.72%/0.38%/1.98%), Rush University Medical Center 
(0.24%/0.08%/1.17%), University of Chicago Medical Center 
(0.51%/0.50%), University of Illinois Medical Center 
(0.33%/0.15%/0.18%), and Saint Francis Medical Center 
(0.12%/0.13%/0.22%).40  Nationally, studies show that major teaching 
hospitals are more likely to be highly penalized than non-teaching 
hospitals.41  A JAMA study found that “major teaching hospitals are more 
likely to be highly penalized than nonteaching hospitals . . . and less likely 
to not be penalized.”42 
 
3. Readmissions Are Not Tied to Hospital Quality  
 
 Critics also point out that not all readmissions reflect poor hospital 
quality.  Specifically, “clear competing risks exist between mortality and 
rehospitalization.  Patients who die soon after hospital discharge do not 
have the chance to be rehospitalized.”43  Thus, hospitals with high 
mortality rates have low readmission rates because of these competing 
risks.44  One study concluded that readmission rates are uncorrelated with 
mortality rates.  The study showed that the best hospitals for heart failure 
(i.e. those with the lowest mortality rates) have high readmission rates.45 
 Another study showed that when providers were more proactive with heart 
failure patient follow-up, including “visit reminders, education, and 
regular feedback,” they experienced higher twelve-month readmission 
                                                           
39 Wes Venteicher & Jordan Rau, Illinois Hospitals Face Fines Over Readmissions, CHICAGO TRIBUNE 
(Oct. 3, 2014), available at http://www.chicagotribune.com/business/ct-hospital-readmissions-met-
20141002-story.html#page=1. 
40 See supra note 35. 
41 Karen E. Joynt & Ashish K. Jha, Characteristics of Hospitals Receiving Penalties Under the Hospital 
Readmissions Reduction Program, 309 JAMA 343, 343 (Jan. 2013). 
42 Id. (using year 1 data, major teaching hospitals were penalized at a rate of 44% and nonteaching hospitals 
were penalized at a rate of 33%.). 
43 Muthiah Vaduganathan et al., Thirty-Day Readmissions: The Clock is Ticking, 309 JAMA 345 (2013). 
44 Id. 
45 Id. 
17#2_MATHEWS.DOC (DO NOT DELETE) 2/5/15 5:50 PM 
2015]  HOSPITAL READMISSION REDUCTION CONCERNS           39 
rates, but lower mortality rates.46  Last, researchers at the Cleveland Clinic 
observed that with HF patients, being readmitted after an inpatient stay 
might actually save a patient's life.  In analyzing 3,857 hospitals, the 
researchers discovered that higher readmission rates following an initial 
hospitalization for HF correlated with a lower thirty-day mortality rate.47 
 In Illinois, Rush University Medical Center, which was discussed 
supra, received a significantly higher penalty in the third year of the 
program which the medical center’s chief medical officer, David Ansell, 
attributes “to the new assessment of joint-replacement patients.”48  
However, Rush’s orthopedic program has consistently ranked as one of the 
best in the country.49  But because “approximately five more people per 
year were readmitted than the federal Medicare standards call for,” Rush 
University Medical Center faced a higher penalty.50 
 Additionally, Massachusetts General Hospital in Boston, which 
was ranked as the best hospital in the country according to U.S. News & 
World Report,51 was penalized 0.51%, 0.25%, and 0.24% in years one 
through three of the Program.52  Among other top-ranked hospitals that 
received the maximum penalty in year one and penalties in year two and 
three of the program were Hackensack University Medical Center in New 
Jersey, North Shore University Hospital in New York, and Beth Israel 
Deaconess Medical Center in Boston (a teaching hospital of Harvard 
Medical School).53  However, the high readmissions rates coupled with 
“unusually low mortality rates . . . reflect that the hospital does a good job 
at swiftly getting ailing patients back into care and preventing deaths.”54 
 
                                                           
46 Alison Mudge et al., The Paradox of Readmission: Effect of a Quality Improvement Program in 
Hospitalized Patients With Heart Failure, 5 J. HOSP. MED. 148, 149 (2010).   
47 Karen Pallarito, High Readmission Rates May Not Mean Worse Hospital Care, U.S. NEWS & WORLD 
REP. (July 14, 2010), available at http://health.usnews.com/health-news/family-
health/heart/articles/2010/07/14/high-readmission-rates-may-not-mean-worse-hospital-care.html. 
48 Venteicher & Rau, supra note 39. 
49 Id. Rush’s orthopedic patients include players for the Chicago Bulls, the Chicago White Sox, and George 
W. Bush.  Department of Orthopedic Surgery, RUSH UNIV. MED. CTR., 
http://www.rush.edu/services/orthopedic-surgery (last visited Dec. 14, 2014); see also Top-Ranked 
Hospitals for Orthopedics, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, http://health.usnews.com/best-
hospitals/rankings/orthopedics (last visited Oct. 13, 2014) (ranking Rush University Medical Center as #6 
out of 1,646 Orthopedics programs across the country). 
50 Venteicher & Rau, supra note 39. 
51 Jordan Rau, Government to Reduce Medicare Funding for Hospitals with High Readmittance Rates, 
CHICAGO TRIBUNE, (Sept. 13, 2012), available at http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2012-09-
13/business/ct-biz-0913-bf-medicare-penalties-20120913_1_high-readmission-readmission-rates-million-
in-medicare-funds. 
52 Supra note 35.  
53 Rau, supra note 51. 
54 Id. 
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4. The Program May Harm Individual Patients 
 
 Although readmission rates declined overall, this decrease may not 
be a demonstration of the success of the Program and rather may be the 
result of more outpatient observation status admissions, which has recently 
expanded significantly.  Specifically, Medicare outpatient observation 
cases in hospitals increased by 230,000 claims in 2011 alone.55  By 
handling patients on outpatient observation statuses, hospitals can at least 
mitigate the risk of receiving readmission penalties because, according to 
the Program, observational status patients are not considered admissions 
according to the Program.56 
 However, the Center for Medicare Advocacy filed a class action 
lawsuit on behalf of fourteen Medicare beneficiaries on November 3, 2011 
in U.S. District Court in Connecticut against CMS alleging that “Medicare 
policies are encouraging hospitals to put patients in observational care 
inappropriately, and sometimes retroactively.”57  The increasing use of 
observational status forces Medicare patients to pay more out-of-pocket 
expenses associated with Medicare Part B, while admitted patients are 
covered under Medicare Part A and thus have their rehabilitative care paid 
for by Medicare.58  Because many Medicare patients cannot afford the 
high costs for observational care, they may forgo the necessary skilled 
nursing.59  While this case did not specifically reference the Program as a 
cause for the increasing use of observation status, researchers have 
consistently been connecting the two. 
 
5. The Program Makes Hospitals Vulnerable to Fraud and Abuse 
Violations 
 
 In addition to the practical and legal consequences of the program 
already mentioned, the Program may make more hospitals vulnerable to 
violating fraud and abuse laws.  Hospitals are combatting the Program in a 
variety of different ways in order to avoid application of the penalty, but 
many of these measures will implicate a variety of laws subjecting 
                                                           
55 Joe Carlson, Faulty Gauge?  Readmissions Are Down, But Observational-Status Patients Are Up–And 
that Could Skew Medicare Numbers, MODERN HEALTH CARE, at 
http://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20130608/MAGAZINE/306089991 (June 8, 2013). 
56 Id. 
57 Id.; Bagnall v. Sebelius (No. 3:11-cv-01703, D. Conn). 
58 Id. 
59 Joe Carlson, Faulty Gauge?  Readmissions Are Down, But Observational-Status Patients Are Up–And 
that Could Skew Medicare Numbers, MODERN HEALTH CARE, at 
http://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20130608/MAGAZINE/306089991 (June 8, 2013). 
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hospitals to even more financial hardship should their measures run afoul 
of fraud and abuse laws. 
 
 
6. Providers Current Solutions 
 
 Many hospitals are focusing their efforts on the care at the time of 
the patient’s discharge (or transition) at which time hospitals “can take 
steps to assure that patients are prepared for discharge, by improving 
transition communication, better managing disease, educating patients 
further and paying closer attention to medication management.”60  
However, for safety-net hospitals with disproportionately high numbers of 
patients that have unsafe housing or unstable employment, “more intensive 
follow-up strategies will likely be necessary for patients with social risks 
to reduce their chance of readmission.”61  In response to its efforts to 
improve its readmissions, Barnes-Jewish Hospital chief medical officer 
stated the hospital “set up follow-up appointments for patients who didn’t 
have their own doctors.  But half of the patients never showed up, he said, 
even after the hospital made reminder phone calls and arranged for free 
rides.  Sending nurses to see patients at home did not significantly reduce 
readmission rates either, he said.”62  These tactics are, however, potentially 
problematic, especially in regard to the prohibitions of Anti-Kickback and 
Civil Monetary Penalties Laws.  
 
7. Implication of Anti-Kickback and Civil Monetary Penalties Law 
 
 The issue hospitals are facing in reducing their readmissions is 
how far they can take discharge planning before crossing the line from 
better care to potentially fraudulent practices.  While it seems that calling 
patients after discharge is legally permissible, delivering prescriptions to a 
patient’s home or providing transportation to a patient to attend a doctor’s 
appointment may be considered a beneficiary inducement.63   
 
                                                           
60 Hospital Readmissions in the Era of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, KINDRED 
HOSPITAL, at http://www.khaurora.com/articles/hospital-readmissions-2147535483/ (Jan. 16, 2013). 
61 Julia Berenson & Anthony Shih, Higher Readmissions at Safety-Net Hospitals and Potential Policy 
Solutions, THE COMMONWEALTH FUND, Dec. 2012, at 2, available at 
http://www.commonwealthfund.org/~/media/Files/Publications/Issue%20Brief/2012/Dec/1647_Berenson_
higher_readmissions_at_safety_net_hosps_ib.pdf. 
62 Rau, supra note 4, at D1.  
63 Nina Youngstrom, Programs to Reduce Readmissions Could Increase the Risk of Fraud and Abuse, 21 
REPORT ON MEDICARE COMPLIANCE 1 (2012). 
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a. The Federal Anti-Kickback Statute 
 
 Under the Anti-Kickback Statute, it is a criminal offense to 
knowingly offer or receive remuneration to induce referrals of items or 
services reimbursable by Medicare (or another federal health care benefit 
program).64  Certain types of payments are excluded from the application 
of the statute within its safe harbors.65  Safe harbors, however, must be 
strictly and precisely followed.  The Statute covers any arrangement where 
any one purpose of the remuneration was to obtain money for the referral 
or to induce additional referrals.66  According to the Anti-Kickback 
Statute, remuneration includes anything of value, in cash or in kind, 
transferred directly or indirectly. 
 
b. The Federal Civil Monetary Penalties Law 
 
 The Civil Monetary Penalties Law, among other prohibitions, 
imposes civil money penalties on an entity that offers or provides 
remuneration to a Medicare (or another federal health care benefit 
program) beneficiary that is likely to influence the receipt of reimbursable 
services for the hospital.67  The Act defines remuneration to include 
“transfers of items or services for free or for other than fair market 
value.”68 
 
c. Application 
 
 This year, OIG issued its first opinion on an arrangement 
implicated by the Program, which aimed to reduce a hospital’s 
readmission rate, Advisory Opinion No. 13-10.  While the advisory 
opinion treated the arrangement favorably, to receive the same treatment 
by OIG, a hospital would have to structure its program exactly the same in 
order to avoid the application of fraud and abuse laws.  OIG also 
emphasizes in its advisory opinions that they cannot be relied upon by any 
other entities and that the opinions are limited only to the specific 
arrangement described in the facts. 
                                                           
64 See 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b. 
65 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b)(3); 42 C.F.R. § 1001.952. 
66 See generally United States v. Borrasi, 639 F.3d 774 (7th Cir. 2011). 
67 42 U.S.C. § 1128A(a)(7). 
68 42 U.S.C. § 1128A(a)(5). 
17#2_MATHEWS.DOC (DO NOT DELETE) 2/5/15 5:50 PM 
2015]  HOSPITAL READMISSION REDUCTION CONCERNS           43 
 In the advisory opinion, the requestor was the subsidiary of a 
pharmaceutical manufacturer that would be paid through various fee 
structures (including a per patient basis) for providing services to a 
hospital’s discharged patients to reduce readmissions.  Included services 
are liaisons who check in with patients regarding compliance with their 
discharge plans, remind patients about scheduled appointments, and help 
patients obtain transportation (at the patient’s own cost). 
 Although the arrangement provided referral sources for the vendor 
and the hospital, OIG concluded the arrangement posed a low risk of fraud 
and abuse under the anti-kickback statute.69 OIG concluded that the 
arrangement posed a low risk of fraud and abuse under the anti-kickback 
statute.  OIG reasoned that the services could potentially save the hospital 
money if the program proved to be successful; this reasoning can be 
criticized because under the Program, penalties are levied despite the fact 
that a hospital may have significantly decreased its readmissions, if the 
readmissions are still above the national average.70 
 Additionally, under the arrangement the patients “unquestionably 
would receive a valuable service without cost,” but OIG concluded the 
arrangement would not violate the Civil Monetary Penalties Law.  OIG 
reasoned that the arrangement would not provide rewards that would be 
likely to influence their selection of a provider and primarily makes a 
person available to remind patients to follow their discharge plans. 
 However, should a different arrangement using these services be 
provided for less than fair market value, or if any company’s 
pharmaceuticals or durable medical equipment is promoted, the hospital 
would be a referral source and the arrangement would implicate the Anti-
Kickback statute.  The arrangement at issue in Advisory Opinion 13-10 is 
very complex and also costly; —perhaps prohibitively costly for safety-net 
hospitals that need readmissions assistance more than most other hospitals.  
Thus, with the exception of the arrangement described in the advisory 
                                                           
69 Office of Inspector Gen. Advisory Op. 13-10, page 10 (Aug. 9, 2013) available at 
http://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/docs/advisoryopinions/2013/AdvOpn13-10.pdf opining, “[t]he opinion specified 
that “The Vendor is a subsidiary of a pharmaceutical company and could provide the Services at below fair 
market value either to obtain data to market the Parent Company’s products or to induce a hospital to 
purchase or prescribe the Parent Company’s drugs.  A hospital could also be a referral recipient under the 
Proposed Arrangement; it could pay above fair market value for the Services to induce the Vendor’s 
employees or contractors to refer patients to the hospital.” 
70 Id. at page 12; OIG also reasoned that those who would interact with the patients (liaisons and hotline 
staffing) would be prohibited from referring the patients to a specific provider; that fees would be 
consistent with the fair market value of the offered services ; and that the arrangement would not be used to 
increase the parent company’s pharmaceutical sales. 
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opinion, many other solutions would implicate the Anti-Kickback statute 
and the Civil Monetary Penalties Law.   
 Providing transportation, for example, is viewed as suspect, and 
OIG has used free transportation offered to patients by drivers 
compensated by providers on a per-patient or per-service basis for 
bringing the patients to the providers’ facilities as an example of an 
abusive arrangement.71  Additionally, some models concerning hospital 
readmission reductions of nursing facility patients rely on hospital-
supplied nurses, which would implicate the Anti-Kickback statute “if the 
hospital is a referral source of the nursing facility.”72 
 
IV.  IMPACT 
 
 The practical and legal concerns discussed throughout this Article 
have pointed out an inconsistency between the policy of the Program 
(better health) and the likely result of the Program (cost recuperation by 
Medicare but worse health).  This section will discuss the predictions 
should the Program persist and the recommendations that will, at the least, 
mitigate the harsh effects of the application of the Program.   
 
A. Predictions 
 
 Because the Program disproportionately penalizes safety-net 
hospitals caring for the most socioeconomically disadvantaged populations 
in the United States, the Program will likely exacerbate disparities in 
caring for the most needy.  The Program provides significant disincentives 
for hospitals to care for patients who have complex medical conditions or 
for patients who are unlikely to have the social and economic support to 
take care of themselves post-discharge.  This is particularly the case if the 
penalties are larger than a hospital’s margins for providing care for those 
patients, which is conceivably foreseeable given the enormity of the 
penalties.73  The excessive nature of the penalties, which is five times 
                                                           
71 See Office of Inspector Gen. Advisory Op. 09-01, page 5 (Mar. 6, 2009) available at 
http://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/docs/advisoryopinions/2009/AdvOpn09-01.pdf; see generally Francis J. Serbaroli, 
Offering Free Patient Transportation Poses Risks, 240 NEW YORK LAW JOURNAL 1, 1–3 (Dec. 10, 2008). 
72 Mark D. Choteau & Michael Crowe, CMS’ Efforts to Improve Coordination of Care Between Acute and 
Post-Acute Care Providers, AHLA CONNECTIONS, at 18 (Oct. 2013) available at 
http://www.huschblackwell.com/~/media/Files/BusinessInsights/BusinessInsights/2013/10/CMS%20Effort
s%20To%20Improve%20Coordination%20of%20Care/Article_AHLAConnections_Chouteau_Crowe_Oct
2013.pdf. 
73 Mark D. Choteau & Michael Crowe, CMS’ Efforts to Improve Coordination of Care Between Acute and 
Post-Acute Care Providers, AHLA CONNECTIONS, at 18 (Oct. 2013) available at 
17#2_MATHEWS.DOC (DO NOT DELETE) 2/5/15 5:50 PM 
2015]  HOSPITAL READMISSION REDUCTION CONCERNS           45 
more than Medicare paid hospitals for the excess readmissions,74 takes 
money away from other essential services that hospitals, and especially 
safety-net hospitals, already struggle to fund.75   
 Practically, the application of the Program may lead to increased 
personal injury lawsuits due to hospitals’ increasing unwillingness to 
admit patients in order to avoid excess readmissions.  The unwillingness to 
admit patients may lead to oversight in signs and symptoms with delayed 
presentation, causing misdiagnosis and undertreatment.  This is 
particularly problematic with symptoms accompanying complex heart 
conditions, which may subside temporarily with emergency treatment, but 
reappear within a short period of time. 
 
B. Recommendations 
 
 While better health care is a worthy cause, the Program’s means 
are insufficient to accomplish its goals.  Instead of penalizing hospitals, 
especially for readmissions that cannot be prevented regardless of the 
quality of care received, a program that funded strategies for hospitals that 
need the assistance the most would be better received.  At the very least, 
however, the program should be amended to first, exclude readmissions 
unrelated to the initial reason for the admission.  This ensures that 
hospitals are only held accountable for readmissions that they could 
potentially prevent. 
 Second, the Program should be amended to incorporate an 
adjustment for various factors, including: dual eligibility status or income, 
frailty, and limited English proficiency.76  These factors acknowledge the 
                                                                                                                                           
http://www.huschblackwell.com/~/media/Files/BusinessInsights/BusinessInsights/2013/10/CMS%20Effort
s%20To%20Improve%20Coordination%20of%20Care/Article_AHLAConnections_Chouteau_Crowe_Oct
2013.pdf. 
74 Factsheet: Hospital Readmissions Reduction Program, AMERICAN HOSPITAL ASSOCIATION, Sept. 9, 
2013, at 1. For this source, I think the website is updated periodically and the older versions are no longer 
available. The current factsheet by the AHA is: Factsheet: Outpatient Evaluation & Management Services, 
AMERICAN HOSPITAL ASSOCIATION, page 2 (Aug. 27, 2014) available at 
http://www.aha.org/content/14/combinedfactsheets.pdf.  
75 See Rau, supra note 4, at D1, (“Some researchers fear the Medicare penalties are so steep, they will 
distract hospitals from other pressing issues, like reducing infections and surgical mistakes and ensuring 
patients’ needs are met promptly.  ‘It should not be our top priority,’ said Dr. Ashish Jha, a professor at the 
Harvard School of Public Health who has studied readmissions.  ‘If you think of all the things in the 
Affordable Care Act, this is the one that has the biggest penalties, and that’s just crazy.’”). 
76 Examining the Drivers of Readmissions and Reducing Unnecessary Readmissions for Better Patient 
Care, AMERICAN HOSPITAL ASSOCIATION, Sept. 2011, at 3.  Currently included in the risk adjustment are: 
age, gender, history of coronary artery bypass graft, and condition categories including history of infection, 
cancer, hematological disorders, malnutrition, drug or alcohol abuse, paraplegia or paralysis, stroke and 
vascular disease, asthma, end stage renal disease or dialysis, urinary tract infection, vertebral fractures, 
septicemia or shock, diabetes, gastrointestinal disorders, dementia and senility, psychiatric disorders, 
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reality that hospitals are not in control of structural barriers that prevent 
patients from accessing important resources needed to combat 
readmissions.  The dual eligibility status is a good indicator that a patient 
lacks important post-discharge resources to take care of herself, and the 
limited English proficiency risk adjustment ensures that hospitals are not 
held accountable for language barriers that prevent a patient from fully 
understanding discharge or medication instructions.  Being able to take 
account of frailty accepts the inevitability of readmissions for elderly 
patients with complex conditions.  No matter how adequate care is 
provided, patients will be readmitted for their own health and safety. 
 
V.  CONCLUSION 
 
 The Hospital Readmissions Reduction Program unwisely penalizes 
hospitals for admissions mostly out of their control.  Armed with evidence 
that “some” readmissions could be preventable, CMS disproportionately 
penalizes hospitals that care for the sickest and neediest. 77 While 
criticisms of the Program have been voiced for years, only now after three 
years of data can these fears be brought to fruition.  Aside from the most 
commonly voiced opinions of the Program is a criticism that has received 
little attention despite the serious penalties potentially involved—fraud 
and abuse concerns.  With hospitals trying to combat the occurrence of 
excess readmissions, fraud and abuse laws will be implicated more and 
more, and at the very least should be considered by hospitals in addition to 
the improvements that should be considered by policymakers. 
 
                                                                                                                                           
congestive heart failure and other heart diseases, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease and lung disorders, 
pneumonia, renal failure, skin ulcers, or other injuries.  Id. 
77 See supra note 3. 
